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Abstract
This paper argues that the usual way of conflating floating with fixed charges as small variations
on a single theme – as priority-based devices differing only in degree – fundamentally
misunderstands its true nature. The floating charge plays a distinctive role as a residual
management displacement device which can only be effective if coupled with an appropriate set
of fixed security that enables its holder to gather information about the competence of the
debtor’s managers and to control their incentives to misbehave. The floating charge allows the
debtor free use of its circulating assets while its management is doing well, and when the
management fails, it crystallises to divest them of control even over these assets. At this time, it
also contributes to controlling the motivation costs of other creditors by discouraging them from
rushing to enforce their claims against circulating assets or threatening to do so, and by ensuring
the unity of the debtor’s estate under the receiver’s control even after the onset of winding-up.
This priority-independent view of the floating charge enables us to explain the peculiarities of its
actual operation, to understand why it is generally taken in combination with fixed charges, and
either over the debtor’s entire undertaking or over those assets not amenable to the draconian
control of the fixed charge, and also to bring out the non-anomalous status of the ‘lightweight’
floating charge. The analysis also helps throw light on the role of registration, and on the
problems occurring at the boundary between the two types of charge. Despite all this, however, it
will be argued that with the onset of changes introduced to the administration regime by the
Enterprise Act 2002, the floating charge has outlived its utility, and that its continued retention is
now difficult to justify.
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1. Introduction: The Mysterious Floating Charge
Whether they praise or (more frequently) condemn it, commentators do not generally realise how
great a puzzle the floating charge is. Consider what we ordinarily expect of a security interest.
Most obviously, the secured creditor would hope to enjoy priority in the proceeds of sale of the
collateral over his debtor’s other creditors. However, the floating charge does a very bad job,
ranking behind not only a later fixed charge over the same assets, but also behind statutory
preferential claims. Once the relevant provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002 come into force, the
categories of preferential creditors will shrink.1 However, a particular proportion of the value of
the collateral subject to a floating charge will be ‘ring-fenced’ for general unsecured creditors,2
leaving the floating charge holder’s position no better off.3 One might also wish a security interest
to encumber the collateral, so that attempts by the debtor to pass on the assets subject to the
charge would be unable to defeat the charge holder’s rights. With a floating charge, however, the
debtor “may deal with or dispose of such property without the approval of, or even consultation
with, the charge holder”,4 and as long as this is done in the normal course of business, the
transferee’s title is unburdened by the charge holder’s rights. At the very least, a secured creditor
would wish to be able to tell how much collateral it had been offered in order to carry out a risk
assessment on the loan. However, the creation of subsequent fixed charges and the accumulation
of new preferential claims can dilute the floating charge holder’s security, as can the debtor’s
ability to alienate the collateral free of the charge. So the floating charge holder cannot even
know which assets it has security over, and how much they are worth! No wonder this has been
described as a “key weakness” of this device.5
Security is also often said to bring efficiency benefits by allowing the secured creditor to
monitor the assets subject to the charge, with the aim of deterring financial agency costs. The
existence of security is said to facilitate this monitoring by creating ‘focal points’ for the
monitoring effort: instead of having to keep an eye globally on the debtor’s affairs, the creditor
may focus simply on the presence, value, and use of the assets given as collateral.6 This lowers
monitoring costs, and on conventional reasoning, some part of these savings might be passed on
to the debtor as lower interest rates. However, as Finch notes, floating charges are generally taken
over the debtor’s entire undertaking,7 which means “monitoring in order to detect misbehaviour
or calculate risks could involve scrutinising the whole business”. In effect on this reasoning,
much of the point of taking security as an aid in monitoring is thus negated. In the result, “the
floating charge may offer a relatively expensive method of securing finance”.8
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So if the floating charge is such a thoroughly inefficacious way of securing a loan from
the lenders’ perspective, why is it more or less ubiquitous in corporate debentures?9 Critics offer a
worrying explanation. Not only is the floating charge a terrible security device, it is also said to
be exploitative. It is “a mechanism peculiarly conducive to the transfer of insolvency wealth from
unsecured to secured creditors”, and most likely “designed” for this very purpose.10 It is “a charge
upon all future property”, sucking in after-acquired assets into its ambit “without the injection of
fresh value by the original creditor”. This creates a “windfall” for the charge holder and ensures
that the rate on the secured loan is “increasingly advantageous” to it.11 These interest rates are
“excessively profitable” because the floating charge holder’s ability to exploit its positions
ensures “risks are loaded onto unsecured creditors”.12 What is more, unsecured creditors may
have insufficient notice of the effects of the charge, since it might be “impossible to tell from the
[company charges’] register how much the floating charges secure”.13 This deceptiveness adds to
the exploitative value of this device, which is sufficiently great to make it universally popular for
powerful lenders (i.e. banks) despite its many disadvantages.14
This is a damning indictment. In response, I want to suggest that the floating charge is not
malignant, merely misunderstood. The floating charge is unlike other security interests, first and
foremost, in that it provides a very poor priority to its holder in the debtor’s insolvency.
Focussing on this and yet keeping in mind its ubiquity encourages a search for its true function. It
is suggested here that a theory claiming to reveal this function could be considered successful
only if it could explain the development of the ‘lightweight’ floating charge, the reason why
floating charges are usually taken over the debtor’s entire estate15 and why they are often coupled
with fixed ones, the distinction between fixed and floating charges, and the desirability or
otherwise of restricting the priority position of the holders of the latter.16 Removing the
misunderstanding as to the actual role of the floating charge would also allow us to quiet concerns
that its main value has been in its ability to exploit. However, while it might not have been
exploitative in the past, it will be argued that its existence will become wholly exploitative after
the coming into force of the relevant portions of the Enterprise Act. It will therefore be suggested
that it should now be abolished.

2. Priority and the Floating Charge
It would be useful to begin by pointing out that the indictment laid out above is selfcontradictory. If criticism of the floating charge as to its efficacy in securing priority for its holder
is correct, then criticism on the basis that it serves as a siphon for taking value away from
unsecured creditors must be wrong.
9
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It is submitted that not only is the floating charge generally ineffective in giving its
holder priority over others, it is in fact not a priority-based device at all.17 First of all, there is no
doubt that the floating charge does not do much for its holder as far as priority is concerned. The
well-known doctrinal facts about its ranking have already been rehearsed. What has not been
done in the past is to view this ranking in the context of the empirical evidence available as to the
recoveries of various classes of creditor in insolvency proceedings. Finch’s recent discussion is a
representative example. She faithfully reproduces the relevant statistics, which generally derive
from the annual Surveys of its members by the Association of Business Recovery Professionals
(ABRP),18 and recently, from the study done by Julian Franks and Oren Sussman.19 From the
latter, Finch reports that “recovery rates for banks [who generally take security] are seventy-seven
percent compared with ‘close to zero’ for trade creditors and twenty-seven percent for
preferential creditors”.20 And according to the ABRP’s most recent Survey, overall recoveries
were thirty-five percent for preferential creditors, fifty-three percent for secured ones, and seven
percent for unsecured ones.21
What Finch does not do, in common with most other commentators, is to draw out the
implications of these figures for the debate about the nature of the floating charge. Important for
our purposes is the recovery rate for preferential creditors, consistently revealed by these studies
to hover around the thirty pence on the pound figure. We should recall that, under the ‘absolute
priority rule’, creditors allocated a junior position in the statutory scheme for the distribution of
insolvent estates are paid anything only if creditors senior to them have been fully paid off. Now
it would be too quick to conclude from this that the average recovery on a floating charge, which
ranks behind preferential debts, is zero. Unsecured creditors rank even further behind preferential
creditors, yet their recovery is above zero at least in the ABRP study. (As noted, it is close to zero
for firms in the Franks and Sussman data set.) However, a broader look at the pattern of
distribution of recoveries overall in insolvency proceedings provides interesting insight.
Preferential creditors get back everything they are owed in just over twenty-five percent of
insolvency proceedings, receive nothing at all in just under twenty-five percent of cases, and
recover less than five pence on the pound in the remainder.22 So not only is there no recovery at
all under a floating charge in almost twenty-five percent of insolvencies (because preferential
creditors receive nothing), there is virtually nothing paid because of the floating charge in another
fifty percent of cases (since preferential claimants get under five percent). And what about the
twenty-five percent of insolvency proceedings in which preferential creditors receive their full
amount, so that there would be a possibility of significant payments to floating charge holders as
well? It is interesting to note that in these instances, the recovery rate for unsecured creditors is
high, at almost twenty-five pence on the pound. This compares not unfavourably with average
recovery rates for both secured creditors – reported in this Survey to be about fifty-three percent23
– and certainly those for preferential one. A likely explanation for this finding is that in such
cases, a high return to preferential creditors indicates that the debtor’s estate has sufficient value
17

In fact, it was in an effort to convert it into a priority-based device that lenders invented the ‘negative
pledge clause’. However, negative pledge clauses are not registrable, so their registration does not fix
subsequent lenders or purchasers of the collateral with constructive notice. So subsequent lenders or
purchasers are not bound by such clauses unless they have actual notice of their existence.
18
See e.g. ABRP, 9th Survey of Business Recovery in the UK (22 November 2001).
19
The Cycle of Corporate Distress, Rescue and Dissolution (IFA Working Paper 306, 2000) (hereafter,
‘Cycle’).
20
Finch at 82 n. 102.
21 th
9 Survey at 18.
22
Ibid., Chart 16.
23
Ibid. Needless to say, the difference between secured and unsecured claims should be expected to be
reflected to some degree in the recoveries for these types of creditor.

4

to pay back all or almost all of the debt secured by the fixed charge. Now since the floating charge
would generally secure the same debt as the fixed one, having enough left over to pay off
preferential creditors in full should be correlated with having sufficient value in the insolvent
estate to meet a significant proportion of the unsecured debt as well (the debt secured by the
floating charge already having been paid, entirely or almost entirely, under the fixed charge).
One immediate conclusion, then, is that the widespread image of the floating charge – as
a device “designed” to create “windfalls” for its holder by voraciously “transferring wealth from”
and “loading the risks of insolvency onto” unsecured creditors – is grossly distorted. From the
very evidence relied upon by its critics, it appears the floating charge directs, at best, tiny
amounts of insolvency value to its holders in three-quarters of all insolvencies, and does not
transfer any wealth at all in another quarter of the cases. This also means the argument that this
charge loads insolvency risk onto unsecured creditors finds little support in the facts. And since
the floating charge seems to take little out of the insolvent estate in an overwhelming majority of
cases, and given the conventional view that a loan secured even by a floating charge is likely to
be at least somewhat cheaper than an unsecured one, there remains little basis for suggesting that
the rates charged on loans secured by floating charges are excessive (at least on the grounds listed
above). Another conclusion is that the fact that registrations of this type of charge do not reveal
the amount secured by, or the particular assets subject to it from time to time, is not objectionable,
since the practical impact of the charge – its ability actually to ‘bite’ on the collateral, to ‘corner’
it for its holder, to apply it towards the discharge of the amount secured – is insignificant in most
cases.24
So whatever else the role of the floating charge may be, it is not to exploit unsecured
creditors by siphoning insolvency value away from them by virtue of the priority of this device.
In fact, as this discussion shows, priority is not a great virtue at all of this charge. This leads to
another conclusion. Let us focus on a peculiar feature of the ‘lightweight’ floating charge, viz.,
that it is taken by a lender whose exposure is fully or at least substantially secured by a fixed
charge,25 so that the floating charge is not required to provide it priority. In light of the quick
discussion so far, it is suggested that lightweight charges are not some special category of floating
charge. In fact, floating charges are essentially ‘lightweight’ in that they are not good at, and
therefore not relied upon to, provide priority for their holders in the proceeds of sale of the
collateral. It would require great faith in the irrationality of lenders which are repeat players in the
market, which lend to tens of thousands of companies a year, and which have accumulated
expertise in dealing with the consequences of default,26 to attribute to them the intention of taking
floating charges in the hope of gaining priority. It is more credible to assume that they would
have long learnt from experience they would get back next to nothing on this type of security in at
least seventy-five percent of insolvencies, and would not need to get anything on it in most of the
remaining.27 In addition and crucially, they could not predict at the time of the loan agreement
24
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which of these groups a particular debtor would fall into, should it become insolvent. So it is not
surprising that generally, floating charges are coupled with fixed ones.28 The two perform
different roles, and it is the fixed one which is relied upon to provide priority, encumbrance, and
risk assessment. Note that on the priority-based view of the floating charge, it is difficult to
provide a satisfactory explanation not only of the rationale for lightweight charges, but also of
why floating charges are normally taken together with fixed ones.29
It is very important to be clear about precisely what is being argued here. The argument is
not that having a floating charge never increases the holder’s recoveries simply by virtue of the
priority of this security. The evidence discussed above is by no means inconsistent with the
proposition that in some insolvencies, the priority of the floating charge would cause a greater
amount of value in the insolvent estate to be diverted to the holder of the charge than would be
the case if the charge did not exist. What is in fact being argued is that this is both rare, and for
that reason, also unpredictable. At the time that the debenture was being issued, it would be very
difficult to determine whether this debtor – should it later have to go through a formal insolvency
proceeding – would constitute one of those rare cases where the priority of the floating charge
would inflate its holder’s recoveries. Put differently, it would be difficult ex ante to predict
whether the eventual insolvency of any particular debtor would constitute the case where the
priority of the floating charge was both, not illusory (because all of the debtor’s property had
been distributed to fixed charge holders and preferential creditors) and not unnecessary (because
the debt secured by the floating charge had already been paid under the fixed charge). Floating
charges may result in some recoveries in some minute proportion of insolvencies, but the
dominant reason for their inclusion in a vast proportion of debentures that create security interests
is not to ensure these rare and trivial recoveries. As explained, it would not be a rational strategy
for a lender seeking to gain priority over other creditors in a useful way to rely on the floating
charge.

3. The Limited Role of the Floating Charge
So what is the floating charge for? It is suggested that it is a residual management displacement
device which can work optimally only when it is part of a package of security interests covering
the whole or substantially the whole of the debtor’s property,30 and generally, only when this
package includes fixed security over assets strategically important to the debtor’s business.31 For
reasons that will soon be apparent, someone holding such a security package will be referred to in
this paper as the debtor’s ‘main creditor’. We can start building up our understanding of all this
by taking into account suggestions about lightweight charges, and others about floating charges in
general made quite recently in the literature. First, in explaining the causes for the emergence of
priority. The claim is of course also that the analysis here coheres with the evidence available while the
priority-based view of the charge does not, and also that it can – in a way that a priority-based view cannot
– explain the structure of the relevant law both before and after the coming into force of the Enterprise Act
2002, e.g. about the provisions requiring registration and some of those governing administration; see
below.
28
See e.g. Cycle at 9 Table 4.
29
Finch attempts to do so, e.g., at 81-2.
30
Compare Insolvency Act 1986, s. 29(2). The argument here is that far from identifying some special
category of floating charge, this provision describes the sort of security package that a floating charge must
generally be part of, in order to be efficacious.
31
A somewhat similar understanding seems to underpin comments by R Goode, Principles of Corporate
Insolvency Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at 204.
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lightweight charges, commentators have seized upon the obvious and important connection
between having a floating charge over substantially the entire estate of the debtor, and being able
to block the appointment of an administrator to manage it. Despite having protected its priority
through a fixed charge, the lender nevertheless values these powers, since they are crucial to
controlling the timing and manner of realisation of the security (i.e. that under the fixed charge).32
Second and not just in the context of lightweight charges, two sets of commentators have
recently highlighted a possible control-based (as opposed to priority-based) explanation of the
floating charge, noting that at least some of its value might lie in being able to take control of the
debtor by appointing a receiver. Armour and Frisby, in their illuminating discussion of
receivership, have noted that it “is conceptually possible to imagine a legal system in which a
‘floating charge’ offers its holder only control rights and no benefits in terms of priority”.33 And
in their empirical study of the cycle of financial distress in the UK’s SME sector, Franks and
Sussman point out that “The crucial feature of the floating charge is that it grants the holder the
right to take control of the firm in the event of default, through the appointment of an
Administrative Receiver. Control of the firm allows discretion over whether to realize the assets
by selling the firm as a going concern or liquidating it. These control rights can considerably
influence the size of the proceeds accruing to the creditor”.34
This brings out an element central to an accurate understanding of the floating charge.
This is the ability to replace the existing management with an outsider. Franks and Sussman focus
on the benefits to the floating charge holder of the ability to do so, but there are obvious
advantages for other ‘stakeholders’ as well. Suppose we divide the causes of default on part of the
debtor broadly into two categories:35 management-related (to do with the incumbents’
“irrationalities, lack of ability, failures of strategy and deficiencies of understanding”, etc.),36 and
management-unrelated (external shocks, macroeconomic comparative disadvantages, inflation,
over-regulation, delayed payments, government policies like those on taxation, etc.).37 The former
category is crucial. Surveys of insolvency professionals routinely identify management-related
causes as being of the greatest importance in corporate failures.38 So for example, one in two
companies undergoing formal insolvency proceedings had suffered distress in the past,39 “yet the
company’s directors still did not prevent insolvency”.40 It is a reasonable assumption that at least
32
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39 th
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some of these insolvencies could have been avoided by providing better leadership to the
company. Indeed, insolvency practitioners claim that about one in four insolvencies could have
been prevented if directors had sought timely advice, but since they did not, “in 4 out of 5 cases
there was nothing [that] could be done to save the company by the time an insolvency practitioner
had been appointed”.41 Subject to appropriate qualifications as to how much weight such findings
should be given, we can postulate that some companies would be able to avoid insolvency
through a change in management. In the case of such companies, other ‘stakeholders’ would
generally be better off if such change could be brought about at the right time.
Now when a debtor appears to be on the verge of defaulting on its obligations, the
preceding analysis provokes the question of how we might design a system which can distinguish
between businesses that would benefit from a change of leadership (i.e. those beset by
management-related problems) and those that would not, and once this information is at hand,
how we might ensure that it could effectively be made the basis of a decision to act
appropriately.42 Gathering information is of course costly, and requires both accumulated
expertise and influence over the debtor. Ideally, it would be based on (a) the debtor itself
reporting potentially relevant information to an appropriate decision-maker, which in turn (b) has
the competence to decide whether the information indicates management failings, and if so, (c)
has the ability to remove the management without unnecessary expense and replace it with a
better one. Let us examine each of these steps in turn.
First, then, consider the relevance of the fixed charge. Loans secured with a fixed charge
are almost universally subject to covenants requiring that the value of the secured assets, or the
income from them, or both, not fall below a certain multiple of the debt secured.43 Especially
when the charge is over strategically important assets, this creates the necessity for the debtor to
explain to the charge holder the strategy pursued, business decisions made, and results obtained.
Further, the fact that the charge encumbers the collateral means that attempts to dispose of these
crucial assets would only succeed if the charge holder approves. This again necessitates the
provision of information justifying the decision to sell. This minimises waste: remember that it is
cheaper for the debtor to volunteer such information than for the creditor to have to extract it for
itself. From the perspective of junior creditors, the benefit is that management’s attempts to
substitute assets (machinery for cash, say, or cash for employee-hours) so as to increase the
riskiness of the debtor’s activities – which would reduce the expected value of all their claims –
become subject to external scrutiny. More relevant to this discussion is the fact that the flow of
such information over a period of time would allow a picture to be built up of managerial
competence, and this picture might be available for examination, should the debtor threaten to
default on the secured loan. However, providing this information and obtaining the consent of the
creditor to crucial decisions by persuading the latter of their wisdom, is costly for the debtor (not
least in time and the marshalling of evidence and arguments). It follows that, especially for
debtors in the SME sector, these costs would be justified only ‘once over’, i.e. for one ‘main
creditor’ per debtor. Any duplication would generally be grossly wasteful.
This last point is reinforced by the fact that all this information provision and gathering is
useful only if the chosen creditor has the ability to make use of it. Developing the competence to
assimilate it and react appropriately would be costly, and economies of scale and the need for
41
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accumulated expertise ensure that only repeat players fit the bill. Even then, of course, the
benefits of being able to tell badly managed businesses (whose value could therefore be increased
by a change of management, to the advantage of all those with claims against it) from those
troubled for other reasons, would have to be sufficiently large to justify this expenditure. A large
number of dispersed creditors, each potentially entitled to a minute fraction of this ‘surplus’,
simply would not have a sufficient incentive to invest in this type of monitoring. If this surplus is
to be preserved, this point indicates the need for a repeat-playing creditor which provides a
significant proportion of the debtor’s credit needs and thus has a significant stake in any surplus
from remedying the debtor’s management deficiencies.44 The most obvious such actors are banks,
and as recent research highlights, there are indeed extensive monitoring arrangements within
them. Monitoring takes place both at individual branches and at specialist ‘central rescue units’
operated by the banks. Firms sent to these units remain there for seven and a half months on
average, and up to seventy-five percent of these are turned around. There is also strong evidence
that banks often encourage firms to remove members of their management team, and further, that
firms significantly improve their chances of being turned around if such changes are made.45
There is little doubt, therefore, that there is an investment on part of main creditors both in
information gathering at individual branches and central ‘central rescue units’, and in the
development of expertise in distinguishing bad managers from good ones.
This leads to the third step in the problem mentioned above, that once information about
management competence has been gathered and analysed, the party in possession of it should be
able to take appropriate action on its basis. The potential problem here would arise if this creditor
had to convince other creditors or a court of the desirability of replacing the existing
management. This is a problem precisely for the reasons mentioned, that verifying the evidence in
court might be expensive (at least in terms of time), and that other creditors might not have
sufficient experience and expertise in being able to tell, say, a bad managerial team apart from a
merely unfortunate one. Further, other creditors, who might only enjoy a tiny proportion of any
surplus arising from the replacement of poor managers, would suffer incentives to hold out for
side-payments from the main creditor.46 Concentrating decision-making powers as to the future of
the management in the very creditor which has built up and assimilated information concerning
these factors would resolve these problem.
This gets us to the point where we must postulate the need for something like the
institution of receivership.47 But it does not explain the need for a floating charge. Ex hypothesi,
the ‘main’ creditor would have fixed charges under which it would enjoy the right to appoint a
receiver with respect to the property subject to those charges. However, this by itself might not be
satisfactory. Recall from the discussion above that subjecting assets to fixed charges involves
significant costs both for the debtor and the lender. The essence of the fixed charge is that its
holder has control over the disposal or (through the operation of loan covenants) significant
change of use of the collateral.48 We have noted the benefits of this control, but it also
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significantly constrains the debtor’s ability to use those assets in the normal course of business.49
For some ‘circulating’ assets, such as certain types of machinery, trading stock, and receivables,50
the cost of crippling the debtor by rendering it unable to proceed without the creditor’s consent,
would far outweigh the benefits of the latter’s monitoring. So creating fixed charges over such
assets would often not be a rational strategy. This creates a problem ex post, once there is both a
default and good reason to believe the management should be displaced. The benefits of
removing the existing management would only accrue if this removal applied to the entirety of
the debtor’s undertaking. This might be because of the synergetic values of retaining under one
management precisely those assets which could not rationally be subjected to the draconian
discipline of the fixed charge. And in any case, what would have been badly managed would be
the entire business, including those assets; so the incumbent managers’ powers would best be
curtailed with respect to the entire business. This would benefit all those interested in the
undertaking of badly managed companies by improving their chances of survival, or otherwise by
ensuring the value-preserving disposal of their business.
This, it is submitted, explains why floating charges are ubiquitous despite their poor
priority position: they represent the residual element in the set of rights required properly to
displace a poorly performing management. This also explains why they are generally coupled
with fixed charges: the latter provide priority, encumbrance, and risk assessment, and also ensure
a supply of the information that is vital to the effective deployment of the floating charge.
Further, this analysis reveals why floating charges are generally taken over the debtor’s entire
undertaking, or else used – in combination with a fixed charge – with respect to assets not subject
to the fixed charge. Their role is to ‘mop up’ and divert away control over (and not priority in)
assets which, while the existing management is doing well, would best be left at their disposal.
Finally, we can also now understand why the oft-repeated criticism that the deceptiveness
of the floating charge has never appropriately been remedied because the mechanism chosen for
this purpose – registration – has never been efficacious, is also misplaced.51 In fact, registration is
not meant to counter the imaginary deceptiveness of the floating charge. Registration serves the
different purpose of revealing the identity of the main creditor of a company. Under the preEnterprise Act law, it would be important to know for this purpose whether someone has fixed
and floating security over all or almost all of the company’s property (rather than to know exactly
how much this person is owed). This would allow co-ordination of efforts by creditors to monitor
the company’s managers in order to control financial agency costs and also to build up a picture
of their general competence. One way in which this might happen would be for potential creditors
– notably, a second bank that might otherwise have set up its own monitoring arrangements – to
refuse to lend upon discovering the existence of a prior floating charge (or else to enter into some
arrangement with the first bank so as to avoid wasteful duplication of monitoring etc.).52 Now
because of its poor and unreliable priority, a floating charge is unlikely to be taken in isolation,
and would generally be coupled with other, fixed, security over some or other of the company’s
property. This is bolstered by statutory provisions discouraging the taking of floating charges
49

This has long been recognised; see e.g. In re Florence Land and Public Works Co 10 Ch D 465, 541 per
Sir George Jessel MR, and Biggerstaff v Rowatt’s Wharf Ltd [1896] 2 Ch 93, 101 and 103, per Lindley and
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That one way of co-ordinating creditor actions is precisely to ensure only one creditor capable of
monitoring the debtor lends to it is sometimes missed by commentators.
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unless the creditor offers new value.53 A creditor seeking security is not going to offer new value
without gaining priority, and it cannot gain priority in a reliable and useful manner with a floating
charge. This further increases the probability that a floating charge would be coupled with fixed
security. It follows that the declaration of a floating charge on the register is a good signal of the
existence and identity of a creditor playing the role of main creditor.
Finally in this Section, it would be helpful to consider the mechanisms whereby control is
transferred away from the management of a troubled debtor.54 The usual way of capitalising on
the fruitful co-working of the fixed and floating charges in the past has been receivership.55 The
receiver may be appointed when there is a default on the secured loan. His appointment will
accompany another significant event. Either the default itself, or his appointment, will crystallise
the floating charge. Once in office, the receiver draws his powers from two sources.56 His in rem
powers “are held in right of the debenture holder and derive from the security created by the
debenture. They include the power to collect in the assets comprising the security, to possess,
control and use those assets and to deal with and dispose of them, whether by way of sale, lease,
charge or otherwise”.57 His personal powers arise by virtue of the fact that he is regarded, by the
terms of the debenture, as the debtor company’s agent, and thus has the power on its behalf to
carry on its business.58 And in order to allow these personal powers to be exercised effectively,
the law implies into the debenture a promise on part of the company that its board would not
interfere with the receiver’s running of the company.59 Importantly for our purposes, note the
three main uses of the in rem powers derived from the floating charge by the receiver. First and as
already mentioned, it acts to divest the board of control over these circulating assets, since the
crystallisation of the floating charge finally encumbers the collateral, and any subsequent
unilateral attempts to pass those assets out of the ambit of the security would not succeed.
Second, the crystallised charge takes priority over, say, charging orders. Were this not the case,
unsecured creditors would have an incentive to rush to press their claims, thus causing the
business to be dismantled and any going concern surplus to be lost. Because of the floating
charge, however, the receiver is taken to be dealing with assets subject to the property rights of
the charge holder, the party with the prior (because of its fixed security) and often primary
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interest in the collateral.60 Third, once the company goes into winding-up, the receiver’s agency
relationship with the company terminates. However, the receiver’s in rem powers with respect to
substantially the whole of the company’s property persist (including over those assets which
could not be subjected to a fixed charge), thus allowing him to continue deploying all of it in a
value maximising manner. Having to hand some assets over to the liquidator might destroy
synergies.
The absence of this feature would have several disadvantages in addition to those already
noted. First, it would encourage other creditors to engage in rent-seeking behaviour by
threatening to initiate a winding up, which would disrupt the receivership precisely by removing
from the receiver’s control assets not subject to the fixed charge. Second and following from that,
if the expected cost of making these side payments was greater than the expected benefit to the
charge-holding ‘main’ creditor of investing in information gathering and assimilation (as a
prelude to initiating receivership if necessary), it would create a disincentive for it to do so. To
the extent that this diminished its ability to detect and control financial agency costs, this would
be harmful to all the claimants as a group. And third, it might encourage the ‘main’ creditor to
substitute liquidation for receivership as the chosen method of management displacement. This
would be undesirable because it might be more expensive to prove to a court’s satisfaction that
the company’s liabilities exceeded its assets or that it was unable to pay its debts as they become
due.61 Much more importantly, the ability to remove the management by relying on a ‘technical’
default on a covenant in the debenture (e.g. requiring the income from some assets not to fall
below a particular level) might be lost. An important benefit of the floating charge is its
contribution to displacing the incumbent management before the company becomes insolvent in a
way verifiable in court (and therefore perhaps more irredeemably).

4. An Old Problem
The discussion so far enables a bit of new light to be thrown on an old problem: the troublesome
matter of distinguishing between fixed and floating charges.62 Confusion as to the whereabouts of
the boundary between these is a consequence of the confused view that, in however weak a
manner, the floating charge is about gaining its holder priority. The key to this problem once
again is to remember that the floating charge is not a priority-based device. This is important
because encumbrance is a function (among other things) of priority, encumbrance and control (of
the encumbered asset by the chargee) are necessarily related, and control is precisely what
distinguishes fixed from floating charges.63 Let us see what this means.
Consider the relationship between two of the features usually associated with a security
interest, that with respect to the assets charged, it grants priority to its holder over the debtor’s
other creditors, and that it encumbers the assets so that they cannot be put beyond the ambit of the
security without the security holder’s consent. Now it is not possible to conceive of an asset being
60
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encumbered without relying on the notion of priority. To say that a charge encumbers an asset is
simply to say that if the asset is transferred without the chargee’s consent, the chargee would
continue to enjoy priority in any proceeds of sale,64 and that in appropriate circumstances, the
transferee’s title to the collateral is subject to the chargee’s interests. To encumber an asset is to
‘entrench’ the priority of the chosen claim with respect to the asset and its proceeds by giving the
claimant a veto over any attempt by the debtor unilaterally to disturb that priority. So
understanding that the fixed charge is connected with priority – in a way that the floating charge
is not – helps us distinguish between the two types of charge. A charge only encumbers collateral
if it entrenches the priority of its holder’s claim, and an asset can only be encumbered by the
charge if the chargee is given control over the use and disposal of the asset.65 Not to have control
means not to have priority. The floating charge has neither one nor therefore the other.
Importantly, it also follows that there is a price the chargee must pay for securing priority
with respect to the proceeds of the assets in the debtor’s insolvency. In order to do so, it must
create and operate the mechanisms necessary for monitoring the use and disposal of the charged
assets, and this it would do by exercising control over the collateral.66 This is a substantive
requirement, not merely a formal one, so that if no control were in fact exercised by the chargee,
then the charge would be characterised as a floating one regardless of the parties’ professed
intentions.67 Having such control does not, of course, ensure that all fixed charge holders would
effectively monitor their debtors. As mentioned above, monitoring in this context is about
gathering information about the debtor’s use of its assets, and about holding a veto over their
disposal or (because of loan covenants) changes in the use made of them. But monitoring is also
about being willing and able to assimilate this information and having the expertise to judge good
from bad management decisions. The discussion above ties the creditor’s acquisition of priority to
its possession and exercise of the power to sanction disposal of the collateral or changes in its use.
How wisely the creditor exercises these powers is a different matter. Be that as it may, we can see
that granting priority does at least create the opportunity for the priority-holding creditor to
monitor the debtor with a view to controlling financial agency costs, and perhaps also, to build up
a picture of managerial competence.
This also shows why it should not generally be possible to ‘separate’ a book debt from its
proceeds, in order purportedly to create a fixed charge on the former and a floating one on the
latter. We can understand these points through an examination of the notorious Court of Appeal
decision in Re New Bullas Trading Ltd.68 The debtor D had agreed to grant “fixed” charges over
all its book debts to creditor C, and to pay all proceeds into a designated account. By the time this
money reached the specified account, the agreement creating the charges envisaged that one of
two things would have happened. There would either have been an event such as an order for the
debtor’s winding up or a petition to put it into administration, or the levying of distress against its
property by another claimant followed by a demand by C, in which case the money in the account
64
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would be subject to a fixed charge and would not be dealt with except as directed by C.
Alternatively, there might have been no such event, in which case the money deposited in the
account would be “released from the fixed charge” and would become subject to a floating
charge, allowing D to deal with it in the normal course of business. Speaking for the Court of
Appeal, Nourse LJ held that
“just as it is open to contracting parties to provide for a fixed charge on future book debts,
so it is open to them to provide that they shall be subject to a fixed charge while they are
uncollected and a floating charge on realisation.”
The discussion above shows that this argument is a non sequitur. Taking the relevant
issues in turn, three points should be noted. First, we should ask whether C was capable of
effectively acting as the main creditor, able – in the way described above – to harness together
fixed and floating charges in a mutually beneficial way. The answer must be in the negative. The
charges granted to C were not the only ones at play. Prior fixed and floating charges had been
granted to the very bank that operated the account into which the proceeds of book debts were to
be deposited. The duplication inherent in granting C a similar package of security interests throws
doubt on its usefulness. D was not a particularly large company, and so, as noted above, the
investment required to derive utility from this sort of security package would only have been
justified once over, i.e., by one creditor. Any duplication of information provision and
assimilation would have been wasteful for the parties concerned. This should lead us to expect
that no such duplication would be present. What is more, the bank would have an inherent
advantage over C in monitoring the deposits in and especially the withdrawals from the account
that D held with it.
So second and unsurprisingly, it is clear from the facts that C’s security package was
virtually devoid of monitoring potential. As discussed above, information about the use of assets
actually subject to fixed security would be provided by the debtor when it sought the security
holder’s permission to dispose of those assets, or to exchange them for riskier ones. For book
debts, this happens when they convert into money in the debtor’s hands, most obviously and
importantly, by being collected. At this point, the debtor comes in possession of cash that might
be used in riskier or negative net present value ways. So it is here that outside monitoring would
be most useful. The contested debenture in Re New Bullas, on the other hand, gave D the right to
deal with the proceeds in the normal course of its business precisely at this point, thus obviating
the need for it to provide any information to C. In fact, the agreement clearly envisaged that C
would rely on monitoring done by the bank: it permitted the latter to furnish to C any financial
statements and other information available to it about D’s assets and liabilities. The fact that C
had given no directions at all as to the book debts subject to the charge even when D became
seriously distressed69 supports the conclusion that (perhaps other than reliance on the bank’s
actions) C was not doing any monitoring of D. So third and finally, the Court’s reasoning is
fallacious. It is perfectly possible to create a fixed charge on future book debts by ensuring that,
inter alia, the debtor accounts to the charge holder for their proceeds as and when they are
collected. However, it is not possible for a charge to be ‘fixed’ if it does not ensure the provision
of at least some information to its holder regarding use of the collateral.
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5. The Changeover from Administrative Receivership to the ‘New’ Administration
It is important to note that the emphasis of the argument here is not on vesting control over the
debtor in someone, like a receiver, who owes primary (in many respects, exclusive) allegiance to
the holder of the floating charge. None of the analysis above depends on any arrangement
featuring such single-minded devotion to the latter’s interests.70 The focus, instead, is on
divesting the incumbent management of control. In fact, it is almost certainly the case that
receivership, especially under the wholly malign influence of decisions like Downsview
Nominees,71 has developed features that, apart from being unnecessary to the mutually beneficial
operation of the floating charge discussed above, are both exploitative and value-destroying.72 All
of these undesirable incidents of receivership have the same roots. They are manifestations of the
motivation costs created by the fact that the receiver expects to benefit from repeat appointments
sent his way by a small group of institutions which act as main creditors with respect to an
overwhelming majority of companies undergoing formal insolvency proceedings,73 who has
predominant responsibility for the appointing creditor’s interests, but the costs of whose actions –
including irredeemably wasteful acts or omissions – is mostly borne by a separate group of
claimants.
Receivership is harmful in at least three respects. First, there are the costs of the
procedure itself, which amount on average to a quarter of the value of the assets in the insolvent
estate.74 A process that consumes such a large proportion of the value it is meant to be
distributing to a pre-determined group of claimants is intrinsically absurd.75 The wastefulness of
the process is strongly indicated by the fact that when receiverships have been tendered out (thus
focussing the burden of any wasteful behaviour primarily on the insolvency practitioner
concerned), their costs have fallen dramatically.76 Arguably, Parliament saw the potential for just
this type of motivation cost to be acute in the institution of receivership when it provided a power
for the liquidator to approach the court to set the receiver’s remuneration.77 However, the courts
(here as in so much else to do with receivership) destroyed the usefulness of this provision by
insisting that they would only intervene if the level of remuneration set in the debenture was
plainly excessive.78 Given that standard terms in debentures provide that the receiver’s
remuneration would be fixed by reference to the charging practices of the receiver’s firm,79 and
given also that the motivation costs mentioned above could be expected to be endemic within the
70
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institution of receivership regardless of the receiver’s firm, the practical effect of this approach
was to render the statutory provisions nugatory. The result is that, even by itself, this externality
associated with receivership is probably sufficient to eat up most of the efficiencies generated by
the otherwise beneficial joint operation of fixed and floating charges.
Second, receivers are now known sometimes to engage in rent-seeking behaviour on
behalf of their appointor by attributing some costs to the floating charge instead of the fixed one,
with a view to inflating the recoveries under the latter.80 This is a practice which does cause loss
to be moved from the party best placed to deal with it ex ante, to those worse placed to do so.
This is doubly the case since it is unpredictable when such rent-seeking behaviour might benefit
the main creditor and when in turn a receiver might resort to it. So the fact that it might happen is
unlikely to bring any (even theoretical) compensating benefits, in the form of lower interest rates
from the main creditor, say. Third and most generally, there is the receiver’s astonishing privilege
to inflict harm on those, other than his appointor, who are interested in the debtor’s estate, even
when this would bring no benefits to his appointor.81 This simply cannot be justified, for reasons
of simple consistency in addition to everything else. Consider the receiver’s duty, owed to junior
charge-holders etc., to obtain the proper market price for the charged assets.82 Keeping aside
historical reasons, there is only one justification for this duty. This is what we might call the
principle against gratuitous harm: not to require the receiver to obtain a proper market price
would be to allow him to inflict gratuitous harm to the interests of junior claimants, which by
definition is without reason and thus without justification. But if this principle applies to matters
concerning the sale price of the charged assets, there is simply no reason for it not to apply to
other functions performed by the receiver. In any case, receivership, as governed by Downsview
and others of its ilk, is probably the only legal institution where property subject to the rights of a
group of individuals is placed under the control of a person not bound to them by a general
principle against gratuitous harm. It is for this reason that decisions like Medforth v Blake83 are so
welcome.84
Be that as it may, taking all these factors together makes it clear that few have reason to
mourn the passing of this value-destroying, exploitative and anomalous institution.85 Importantly,
however, we should keep in mind the clear distinction between the floating charge, and
receivership, the latter being only one possible way in which the advantages of this type of charge
might be captured. Nothing in this discussion detracts from the analysis above, which points to
the benefit of a properly informed creditor being able to remove the under-performing
management of a defaulting firm without having to expend resources persuading other creditors
or a court of the wisdom of this decision.
I suggest that the recent legislative changes to administration have moved precisely in
this direction.86 Under the changes introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002, an administrator might
be appointed either by court order or out of court. The latter route is generally available only to
the debtor company itself or its directors, and to the holder of a security package that includes at
80
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least one floating charge and which covers substantially the whole of the company’s property, i.e.
the main creditor. The court order route is open in addition to any of the company’s creditors (and
to the justices’ chief executive for a magistrates’ court). Consistently with the analysis above,
three points are of interest here. First, the main creditor may continue to appoint an administrator
on the basis of a ‘technical’ default under the debenture secured by the floating charge. It need
not be demonstrated that the company is insolvent, whether the administrator is appointed out-ofcourt87 or by court order.88 As noted above, this would allow a poorly performing management to
be displaced early enough for the debtor to have a better chance of survival. Contrast this with the
fact that anyone else seeking to appoint an administrator through either route would have to rely
upon the fact that the company is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts.89
Second, ordinary creditors would have to prove to the court’s satisfaction that the
administration order was reasonably likely to achieve the “purpose of administration”.90 Given
the way the purpose of administration has been framed in the legislation,91 this is likely to be a
significant burden for most creditors. Note that before ordering an administration, the court would
have to be satisfied of one of three things. First, the petitioning creditor would have to show that
the administration was required to rescue the company as a going concern, which in turn would
require the demonstration that despite its insolvency, the company was still more valuable as a
going concern and hence worth preserving,92 and (at least by implication) that the directors were
unwilling to or incapable of complying with their duty to direct their best efforts to bringing about
87

Sch. 16, para. 16.
Sch. 16, para. 35(2).
89
Enterprise Act 2002, Sch. 16, paras. 11(a) (court order) and 27(2)(a) (out-of-court appointment by the
company or its directors). In the case of directors, this requirement probably exists to counter the
motivation costs arising in a situation where the advantages to the directors of having a moratorium in place
outweighed the costs of administration to them, even though administration was not in the interests of all
the relevant parties as a group. The declaration of insolvency (or near insolvency) required of them serves
to bring home to them the fact that the company would thenceforth be operated (at least until it recovered),
not in their interests (say) qua shareholders, but in the interests of its creditors as a group.
90
Sch. 16, para. 11(b) and the definitional para. 111(1).
91
The statutory objectives of administration have been defined and ranked in a very interesting way, and
are worth producing here in their entirety. Sch. 16, para. 3 provides that:
(1) The administrator of a company must perform his functions with the objective of(a) rescuing the company as a going concern, or
(b) achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would be likely
if the company were wound up (without first being in administration), or
(c) realising property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or
preferential creditors.
(2) Subject to sub-paragraph (4), the administrator of a company must perform his functions in the
interests of the company’s creditors as a whole.
(3) The administrator must perform his functions with the objective specified in sub-paragraph
(1)(a) unless he thinks either(a) that it is not reasonably practicable to achieve that objective, or
(b) that the objective specified in sub-paragraph (1)(b) would achieve a better result for
the company’s creditors as a whole.
(4) The administrator may perform his functions with the objective specified in sub-paragraph
(1)(c) only if(a) he thinks that it is not reasonably practicable to achieve either of the objectives
specified in sub-paragraph (1)(a) and (b), and
(b) he does not unnecessarily harm the interests of the creditors of the company as a
whole.
92
Otherwise, Sch. 16, para. 3(3)(b) would apply.
88

17

a turnaround in its fortunes.93 Merely showing that the company was unable to pay its debts
probably would not do, since that would still leave open the possibility that its distress was due to
management-unrelated factors which the current directors themselves could steer it out of.94
Second and alternatively, the creditor would need to convince the court that interposing
administration before liquidation would achieve a better result for the company’s creditors as a
group, probably by preserving the company’s business, in whole or part, as a going concern.
Once again, this would obviously depend on demonstrating that the company’s existing
management was not complying with its legal obligations.95 Competent managers could be relied
upon to perceive and respond to the need either for a formal insolvency proceeding (liquidation or
administration) or at the least, the benefit to the company of the moratorium obtained through,
say, administration, on the pursuit of claims against it. Finally and if neither of the above
conditions was satisfied, the petitioning creditor would have to show that an administrator would
be better able to realise the company’s property in order to make a distribution to secured or
preferential creditors as appropriate, than the incumbent management. For the reasons already
given, this could only be done by showing that the managers were not taking every step they
reasonably ought to be taking to minimise loss to the company’s creditors (including, if
appropriate, the initiation of a formal insolvency proceeding).96
For most creditors, being able to muster the evidence and arguments necessary to meet
this burden would be very difficult indeed, requiring at the least something equivalent to the Rule
2.2 report that had virtually become a sine qua non for a successful application for administration
under the old law.97 The central aims of obtaining something like this report are of course to
gather information about the debtor, and about whether it would benefit from the change of
management that administration brings about. If the arguments made above are correct, the
requirement to have such a report prepared should be waived for the main creditor, since the latter
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could be presumed to have acquired precisely that information through the normal operation of
his security interests. A report would be superfluous and thus wasteful both of time and resources.
The new law is quite consistent with this analysis. Under it, the company’s directors, and more
significantly, its main creditor, both are allowed to proceed without a court order simply on the
strength of a statement by the intended administrator that “in his opinion the purpose of
administration is reasonably likely to be achieved”.98 This treats the directors and the main
creditor as on par in being in possession of information as to whether the company’s business
would benefit from a change of management. Either can be relied upon to arm the intended
administrator with this information, enabling the latter to form the opinion that the purpose of
administration is likely to be satisfied. This is bolstered by provisions which make it an offence
knowingly to rely on a statement in making an out-of-court appointment that is false and that the
appointor does not reasonably believe to be true.99 Crucially, of course, neither the company’s
directors nor its main creditor have to persuade the court that the purpose of administration is
likely to be fulfilled. Instead, the burden of showing the nominated administrator’s statement to
this effect to be false lies on the party wishing to challenge it.
So third and following from both the points just made, there is a clear reliance on the
main creditor to distinguish between a poor management, and a capable but unfortunate one. For
the main creditor, the need to persuade the court that a particular debtor could benefit from a
change of management is transformed into the need merely to demonstrate that the debtor is in
default. The only hurdle that the main creditor must overcome in displacing its debtor’s
management by this route is exactly the one suggested here, viz., that there is a default on a
secured loan, and that it considers itself able justifiably to back the statutory statement by the
nominated administrator, viz., that to allow the management to remain in place would be to
jeopardise either the company’s survival or the interests of all, or if appropriate, some, of its
creditors.

6. Why the Floating Charge Must Now be Abolished
The argument so far has been ‘positive’ in the sense that I have attempted to show the role
actually played by the floating charge under the pre-Enterprise Act law, rather than ‘normative’ in
the sense of advocating some change in the law.100 Finally, however, I want to go further and
explain why this paper claims to be an elegy for the floating charge, and not merely a eulogy. I
will do so through a three-pronged argument. It will be suggested first that the beneficial role
played by the floating charge under the pre-Enterprise Act law has now been rendered useless.
This is the demise announced in the title of this paper. Second, the Enterprise Act retains certain
functions for the floating charge, but it will be suggested that these do not depend on anything to
do with its essential nature. They could equally be performed in other ways, and so do not justify
the retention of this device. And finally, it will be claimed that the unnecessary retention of the
floating charge will now cause it to operate, if only in a very small proportion of insolvencies, in
a wholly exploitative manner.
Taking these points in order, then, recall that before the new administration procedure
was introduced by the Enterprise Act, the floating charge was performing two main functions
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with respect to distressed companies. When such a company defaulted on a secured loan and the
main creditor formed the judgment that the default was due to management-related reasons, the
(now crystallised) floating charge would be used to mop up control, proprietarily, over those
assets which could not rationally be subjected to a fixed charge during the company’s normal
operation. Second and should liquidation start once receivership was underway, the floating
charge would prevent the liquidator taking possession of these assets, thus preserving any
synergetic value. The receiver’s in personam powers to manage the business having ceased upon
the initiation of winding-up, he would have to rely on the in rem powers gained under the floating
charge. Note also that the main creditor would generally (though not always)101 have preferred
receivership, (a) because it could make an out-of-court (and thus non-wasteful) appointment of a
receiver but not of an administrator, (b) because the receiver could apply the debtor’s assets
towards discharging the secured debt while the administrator could not, (c) because of the
receiver’s near-exclusive attention to the chargee’s interests, and of the greater rent-seeking
potential of receivership, and (d) perhaps because of the legal-commercial inertia which tends to
favour familiar procedures over unfamiliar ones.
Contrast the present position. The new administration procedure creates a status which
confers on its holder all the powers the floating charge would have conferred on the receiver,
while removing the features that made the ‘old’ administration undesirable. The administrator
acts as the company’s agent,102 his appointment divests the directors of control globally (and not,
of course, simply over assets subject to fixed security),103 and also prevents the appointment of a
liquidator.104 The administrator may now be appointed out of court without having to prove
insolvency and even on the basis of a technical default, as noted, and he is now able to make
distributions to creditors.105 So all the mutually beneficial functions previously performed by the
floating charge have now been rendered redundant.106
Second, however, the Enterprise Act retains two important roles for the floating charge.
Most important is the way the Act continues to define the main creditor. For the purposes of the
Act, this is someone with one or more debentures (a) at least one of which declares that its holder
has the right to appoint an administrator, and (b) at least one of which contains at least one
floating charge.107 Now the first condition is unobjectionable, simply requiring a record of the
creditor’s claim to act as the main creditor for this company. However, the second condition
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makes less sense. We know from the analysis above that, if the purpose is to enhance the value of
the debtor’s business to all those with claims against it, a creditor should only have the unilateral
right to displace the debtor’s management if it had both, the ability to gather and assimilate
information about its competence, and the expertise to decide on its basis whether the removal of
this management was warranted. There should also be some way of discouraging other creditors
from engaging in opportunistic behaviour. Now the ability to gather information arises from the
possession of fixed charges over assets strategically important to the debtor’s business. The role
of floating charges is very much a residual one, basically to ensure that the security package as a
whole covers the debtor’s entire estate and undertaking. This would enable the entire estate to be
kept under one management, thus protecting any synergies. Recall also that as a rule, the purpose
of a floating charge is not to secure priority for its holder, since its priority position is weak,
generally unnecessary (because it most often secures the same debts as the fixed charges), and
quite unreliable ex ante. It follows that since an alternative method has now been provided to
divest the managers of control over essentially revolving assets, of preserving synergies, and of
capturing the benefits previously associated only with an ensuing receivership, the floating charge
no longer has any necessary role to play in our conception of the ‘main creditor’.
The second role assigned to the floating charge by the Enterprise Act is of allocating
priority as between those claiming to act as main creditors to a company. Priority of the floating
charge for this purpose is by date of creation, but this may be altered by agreement among all
those holding such charges.108 Unless it agrees otherwise, the holder of any prior charge is given
the right to a minimum of two business-days’ notice if the holder of a junior charge intends to
appoint an administrator,109 and may if it so chooses ask the court for its own nominee to be
substituted for the person appointed by the junior chargee.110 Now it is entirely sensible for a
mechanism to be provided which allows for the co-ordination of monitoring responsibilities,
since, as noted, there should only be one creditor investing in the monitoring of most companies.
A truly effective way of ensuring this would have been to grant unilateral managementdisplacement rights only to the prior-most chargee (identified chronologically as a default, and
otherwise by agreement).111 It could perhaps be argued that allocation of the right to determine
the identity of the administrator (which is what the legislation is doing here) is an attempt to
create a similar incentive structure. However, what matters is the chosen creditor’s ability to
gather information, and this is connected of course with the fixed charge, not the floating one. So
the focus here in the legislation on the latter seems quite arbitrary, a hangover from the period
when the floating charge was required to preserve the unity, upon management displacement, of
the debtor’s entire estate. The allocation of monitoring responsibilities and thus of the unilateral
right to displace the incumbent management could just as easily be made by, say, attaching the
declaration of the right to appoint an administrator112 with the first fixed charge over some (or any
of a specified list of) strategically important assets.113 The floating charge simply is not required
as a distinct entity, and the legislative focus on it is hard to justify.
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Moving now to the third prong of the argument, it is suggested that this focus on the
floating charge in the new law is not only useless but also harmful. Here is why. It has repeatedly
been argued that the priority of the floating charge is weak, unreliable, and often unnecessary. It
was also noted, however, that in some (on the basis of the evidence considered, minute)
proportion of insolvencies, its priority position would cause its holder to receive more from its
insolvent debtor’s estate than it otherwise would have. And this is what makes the continued
existence of the floating charge objectionable.
Remember that in the distribution of an insolvent estate, the priority of one creditor over
a non-consenting other is a privilege. It must be earned in a way which brings benefits to all the
relevant parties as a group. Let us call this the ‘privilege view’ of security interests. Traditionally
minded English lawyers have attempted to provide other justifications that circumvent the
privilege view, most notably those based on the freedom of contract of the chargor and chargee,
and on the property rights of the former. For reasons well explored in the existing literature,
neither holds water. Freedom of contract arguments “have force only with respect to
arrangements that do not create direct externalities. [When] the contract directly impinges on the
rights of third parties, there is no prima facie presumption of freedom of contract”.114 The truth of
this proposition and of its close variants is attested by diverse parts of the legal system,
competition law being perhaps the most important example. The privilege view of (prioritybased) security interests is an acknowledgement of the fact that they seem to constitute a violation
of this principle. At least prima facie, the contract whereby A grants a security interest to B
transfers loss that would otherwise have fallen on B upon A’s insolvency, to C (junior creditor), a
stranger to this contract. The argument that the grant of a security interest is no more than an
exercise of A’s property rights fares no better, given that the extent of these rights is a matter of
what the law allows, and whether the law should allow security interests to be created is precisely
what is in need of justification.115 It might be useful to restate this summary, and the privilege
view of security interests, using concepts peculiar to insolvency law. An attempt to improve one’s
position compared to what it would otherwise be under the insolvency distribution scheme, but
which does not bring compensating benefits to those relative to whom this improvement would be
brought about, is nothing more than a preference, objectionable on exactly the same grounds as
any other.116
Now as a rule, a fixed charge fulfils the requirements of the privilege view. Its holder
deserves its priority position in its debtor’s insolvency because the charge (a) helps control
financial agency costs, or (b) encourages the chargee to provide new funding to troubled
companies which, in the absence of the priority of fixed security, would not have been provided,
or (c) both. This is mutually beneficial for all the parties interested in the debtor’s undertaking
since it lowers the risk of its ending up in insolvent liquidation and thus raises the expected value
of the claims of all of its creditors, secured and unsecured.117
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The floating charge brings no such benefits, however. Because it does not entrench the
priority of its holder’s claim with respect to the collateral, it can make no contribution to the
control by its holder of financial agency costs. And because its priority is highly unreliable ex
ante, i.e. at the time at which the charge is created, an offer of a floating charge to a potential
lender by a troubled company does not noticeably increase the chances of its receiving new
funding.118 The distinctive value-enhancing contributions of the floating charge have already been
discussed, and while these contributions persisted, it was perhaps justifiable for its holder to be
given the benefit of its priority in the small proportion of insolvencies where there would be such
a benefit.119 However, it has been argued that the floating charge no longer performs any
distinctive socially useful role. All the social benefits previously derived from coupling it with
fixed security and receivership can now be captured simply through the combined operation of
fixed security and the new administration procedure.
Nevertheless, commercially powerful lenders (most obviously, banks) would continue to
include floating charges in their debentures because (a) it is statutorily required in order to obtain
the ability unilaterally to appoint an administrator (though nothing special about its nature makes
this necessary), and (b) they would have nothing to lose and some advantage to gain from the
prospect, however distant, of the usefulness of its priority. However, this priority, no matter how
unlikely it is to be efficacious, would be merely exploitative when it did turn out to be useful,
accomplishing nothing except the improvement of the position of its holder compared to what it
would otherwise have been. In those rare cases, it would be draining insolvency value away from
ordinary unsecured creditors, without (any longer) bringing them compensating benefits. Simply
put, the retention of the floating charge now creates a mechanism for preferences to be obtained
in some insolvencies which are every bit as objectionable, as a matter of principle, as any caught
and avoided by section 239 of the Insolvency Act.120

7. Some Concluding Thoughts
This paper has argued that the usual way of conflating floating with fixed charges as small
variations on a single theme – as priority-based devices differing only in degree – fundamentally
misunderstands its true nature. The floating charge has played a distinctive role as a residual
management displacement device which could only be effective if coupled with an appropriate
set of fixed security that enabled its holder to gather information about the competence of the
debtor’s managers and to control their incentives to misbehave. The floating charge allowed the
debtor free use of its circulating assets while its management was doing well, and when the
management failed, it would crystallise to divest them of control even over these assets. At this
118
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time, it would also contribute to controlling the motivation costs of other creditors by
discouraging them from rushing to enforce their claims against circulating assets or threatening to
do so, and by ensuring the unity of the debtor’s estate under the receiver’s control even after the
onset of winding-up. This priority-independent view of the floating charge enabled us to explain
the peculiarities of its actual operation, to understand why it was generally taken in combination
with fixed charges, and either over the debtor’s entire undertaking or over those assets not
amenable to the draconian control of the fixed charge, and also to bring out the non-anomalous
status of the ‘lightweight’ floating charge. The analysis also helped throw light on the role of
registration, and on the problems occurring at the boundary between the two types of charge.
Despite all this, however, it was argued that with the onset of changes introduced to the
administration regime by the Enterprise Act, the floating charge has outlived its utility, and that
its continued retention is now difficult to justify.
It would be useful at this point to highlight three important issues that have not been
examined in this paper. First and even if the arguments developed here do explain the nature of
the floating charge as it exists at the present time, do they apply to its early history as well?121 Has
the floating charge never been a priority-based device? While I am content with the claim that the
above analysis explains the floating charge as it operates at the present, there is at least some
reason to think that it would never have been relied upon primarily for its priority, both because it
would never have encumbered the collateral, and because it was always subject to preferential
and (when there was a distinction between the two) Crown claims122 which would be difficult to
quantify ex ante. Second, it is important to note that the points made above have significant
implications for the validity of ‘automatic crystallisation clauses’, which purport to crystallise a
floating charge upon the occurrence of a specified event even when neither of the parties is aware
of this. Once again, this is an effort to acquire priority for the holder of the floating charge
without requiring it to exercise control over the collateral. For the reasons explained above,123 the
efficacy of this must be in serious doubt, normatively and by implication of the Privy Council’s
decision in Agnew. And finally, space does not allow consideration of whether and how the
analysis here fits in with the Law Commission’s recent proposals about the reform of security
interests.124 These questions, and others, require further thought.
I want to conclude by quickly suggesting two ways in which we might deal with the
problem that, as I claimed above, has now arisen from the retention by the Enterprise Act of the
floating charge. First and more obviously, the floating charge might be abolished outright,
perhaps as part of the reforms which, it is hoped, would be brought about as a result of the Law
Commission’s ongoing investigation into reform of security interests. Alternatively, the
Enterprise Act has laid down that a certain proportion of the value of property subject to a
floating charge is to be distributed to unsecured creditors.125 The appropriate proportion has yet to
be specified. Now if the floating charge were a priority-based device, then this restriction on its
priority might well have been objectionable, since, for example, it would dilute the ability of a
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troubled firm to attract new funding, thus harming all those with claims against it.126 However, in
view of the arguments made above, it is submitted that there is a strong case for setting at the
highest level politically feasible the proportion of property which should go to unsecured
creditors, right up to one hundred percent. The floating charge is not relied upon for priority,
except opportunistically (i.e. ex post), so this would result in some benefit to unsecured creditors
and would cause no harm to creditors who take security.
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